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Abstract 
In this paper, we study the behaviors of imitated agents who compete for a limited resource through Evolutionary Minority Game.
The agents are mapped into vertices on small world networks proposed by Newman and Watts [1] (NW small world networks). 
The numerical results show that the probability distribution P (p) is different for different prize-to-fine ratio R, and has a phasic 
evolution. The performance of the system with NW small world networks is better than that of the system with WS small world 
networks [2]. 
© 2009 Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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1. Introduction
In recent years agent-based models of complex adaptive systems [3] have attracted much attention among 
scientists in different research areas [4-6]. Motivated by the bar-attendance model proposed by Arthur [7], Challet 
and Zhang [8] proposed the minority game (MG). The basic MG comprises N agents, where N is an odd number, 
repeatedly competing to be in a minority. Despite its simplicity, the MG has been demonstrated to have very rich 
and complex dynamics. 
Subsequently, Johnson et al. [9] introduced the evolutionary minority game (EMG) as extension of the basic MG. 
In EMG, all agents carry the same dynamical strategy at a moment in time together with a p-value (known as gene 
value or strategy), characterizing the probability that an agent is to follow the prediction of the strategy. At the end 
of each turn, agents who end up in the minority (majority) group win (lose) and are awarded (deducted) one point. 
Poorly performing agents with scores below a threshold d (d<0) are allowed to change their p-value by taking a new 
value in an interval [p-dp, p+dp]. Upon strategy modification, the agent’s score is reset to zero. A remarkable 
conclusion deduced from EMG is that the population of the agents tends to self-segregate into two opposing groups 
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characterized by extreme behavior(pĬ0 or 1). Lo.et al. [10] gave an analytical explanation for this self-organized 
effect. Subsequently, some modifications of EMG are proposed to investigate the factors for the self-segregation 
[11-14]. 
Recently, complex networks are introduced to study the effect of imitation on EMG. Kirely [15] considered the 
EMG on WS small world networks and found the best performance of system occurred on a small world network. 
However, Chen et al [16] found that the system’s performance for regular network could be better than that for small 
world network. And they also found that there exists positive correlation between C and the system improvement.  
In this paper, we study the effect of imitation to EMG on NW small world networks. Contrasting to that on the 
WS small world network, the system’s performance for the NW small world network with the same probability Ps is 
better. 
2. The Model
 First, we construct the NW small-world networks. Starting from a ring lattice with N vertices and 2k edges per 
vertex, we add the links between randomly chosen pairs of sites with the probability Ps, but no connections are 
removed from the regular lattice.  
In our networked EMG model, an odd number N of agents repeatedly choose whether to be in group A (i.e., buy 
a given asset) or group B (i.e., sell the asset), respectively. Each time the winners, i.e., those in the minority group, 
win R point; while the losers, i.e., those in the majority group, lose one point. We call R the ratio of prize-to-fine. 
Each agent knows the scores and the p-values of his neighbors. As the agents are mapped to vertices on networks, an 
agent is called another’s neighbor if there is a link between them. At each time step, every agent compares his score 
with his neighbors. The best neighbor is the one with the highest score. In the case of a tie between neighbors, one 
of them is chosen randomly to be the best one. If the agent’s score falls below a value d(d<0), and he has a less 
cumulative score than his best neighbor, he will modify his p-value. The new value is chosen with a uniform 
probability from the interval (pbestˉdp, pbestˇdp ), where pbest is the probability of the best neighbor; otherwise, he 
chooses a new p-value randomly from the interval (pˉdp, pˇdp ). A reflective boundary condition is imposed in 
the p-space insuring that 0İpİ1.
Let A(t) be the number of agents choosing group A at time step t, then the variance of A(t) over a time period T
can be used as a measure of utilization of the limited resources: 
                           2
1
1 ( ( ) )
T
t
A t A
T
σ
=
= ¦ −                    
where 
1
(1/ ) ( )T
t
A T A
=
= ¦ t is the mean number of agents choosing group A.
1742 H.-J. Quan, C.-Y. Zhu / Physics Procedia 3 (2010) 1741–1745
Author name / Physics Procedia 00 (2010) 000–000 
3.   Simulations and results
  We consider a system with N=1001, d=ˉ4 and k =5. From Figs.1-3, data are obtained in a window of T=105
after t=2h106 time steps; for Fig.4, when 2dp0.001, data are obtained in a window of T=105 after t=108 time steps, 
when 2dp >0.001, data are obtained in a window of T=105 after t=107 time steps. All data are also averaged over 10 
independent runs.  
Fig.1 shows P(p) for different rewiring probability Ps with R=1 and 2dp=0.1. From Fig.1 we find that the P(p)
becomes peaked around p=0 and p=1. The differences among them are not distinct. So the difference in the system 
performance showed later cannot be explained simply by the distributions in p-space. 
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Fig.1. The distribution P(p) for different rewiring probability Ps.
Fig.2. gives the distribution P(p) for different prize-to-fine ratio R with 2dp=0.1 and Ps=0.1. From the figure, we 
see that when R<Rc (here Rc≈0.99,the value of Rc depends on the number of agents and the parameter d), the P(p)
forms an invert U-shaped, the population tends to crowd around p=1/2. When R≈Rc, the population self-
segregatesand peaks around p=0 and 1. When R>1, the distribution is very flat. It can be explained as follows. 
   For small values of R, the fine for one lose can not be compensated by the prize for one win, in order to survive in 
such harsh conditions, agents must win more times than lose. For agents with p=0 and 1, they have the same chance 
to win and lose, while for agents with p=1/2, they have the probability to win more times thanto lose. Therefore, 
agents tend to cluster around p=1/2. For R>1, the prize is larger than the fine, no matter what probability the agent 
has, he can survive. Therefore, there is no advantage in having any specific p over others. 
In order to further investigate the influence of the prize-to-fine ratio R, we plot the variance as a function of R in 
Fig.3. It is seen that when R<Rc, the variance is large, but it decreases a little with increasing R, and reaches a 
minimum at R=Rc. When R>1, the variance increases and is also larger than that at R=1 . It implies that the best 
cooperation among the agents occurs at R=Rc.
We plot the variance as a function of 2dp for different Ps in Fig.4. From the figure, we find that the variance of 
NW networks is smaller than that of WS networks with Ps=0.1 and Ps=0.01.
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Fig.2. The distribution P(p) for different prize-to-fine ratio R
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Fig.3. The variance as a function of the prize-to-fine ratio R
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Fig.4. The variance of WS and NW networks as a function of dp for different Ps.
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The reason is that the NW networks has the larger clustering coefficient than that of   WS networks. Larger 
clustering coefficient means that the agents have more chances to get more information. Therefore, the system gets 
more benefit from the imitation. 
4.  Summary 
In this paper, we study evolutionary minority game in which evolution is made through local transmission 
among agents on NW small world networks. In contrast to WS networks, the clustering coefficient of NW small 
world networks is larger and the cliquishness of NW networks is higher. Therefore, agents get more information 
through local transmission and the system as a whole gets more benefit from the imitation. 
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